Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

30

BACKGROUND PAPER FEBRUARY 1990

COMPLIANCE WITH CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES: FROM HELSINKI TO STOCKHOLM

by Michael Holmes

On 28 August 1987 four United States Army officers arrived at a Soviet military base northeast of Minsk to inspect a military exercise involving 16,000 troops and 425 tanks. The US officers were greeted at the airport by two Soviet generals and briefed on the structure and purpose of the exercise. They were permitted access to air and ground transportation to view the manoeuvre, and allowed full use of cameras, binoculars, maps and charts. After the forty-eight hours allotted for the inspection, the officers left the Soviet Union satisfied that the force levels given in the Soviets' prior notification of the exercise had not been exceeded and that their hosts had been positive and forthcoming.

The challenge inspection described above, the first of its kind by the United States in the Soviet Union, was carried out in accordance with the 1986 Agreement of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CCSBMDE), more commonly known as the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). The goal of the agreement is to reduce the risks of armed conflict resulting from misunderstanding or miscalculation. The inspection outlined illustrates the use of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in international relations. Further, it presents an example of how the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement in particular has worked toward creating a more open, cooperative and predictable environment in European security affairs.

Since World War II, CBMs have been pursued in proposals such as President Eisenhower's 1955 *Open Skies* programme, the 1958 Rapacki Plan, and the 1963 'Hotline' agreement between the

TERMS*

Verification: The determination, to a high degree of confidence, whether or not a signatory has complied with an agreement. Verification can take many forms, including on-site inspection and observance of actions as they occur, national technical means — that is, satellites, pre-positioned listening devices, and the like — and covert surveillance (spying), among others.

Transparency: Refers to the visibility and predictability of military actions. Information exchanges and prior notification of military activities, for example, increase the transparency of military activities.

Notification: Announcement, in writing or otherwise, of military activities prior to their occurrence. In the recent European experience, only activities of certain sizes and types have required notification.

Information Measures: Some agreements require the exchange of information between parties to encourage openness — for example, the location of military bases and facilities, or military budget figures.

Constraining Measures: Impose limits on certain types of military activity — for example, the timing, location, size, type, frequency or duration of activities.

Declaratory Measures: Statements of intent — for example, vowing no-first-use of nuclear weapons. Declaratory measures are often unilateral.

Observations: The viewing, by military or other personnel, of the military activities of another country.

Challenge Inspections: Similar to observations, except that the initiative to observe is taken by the inspecting party when compliance is in question.

Movements and Manoeuvres: Military movements can consist of changes in location of units. Manoeuvres are frequently tactical exercises, imitating conditions of war and having limited duration. These terms have, at times, been interpreted differently by different countries.

*These terms are subject to differing official interpretations. The definitions given here are intended simply to provide the reader with a better understanding of how these terms are used in the context of the paper.

90-03391/

United States and the Soviet Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), from 1973 to 1975, resulted in the Helsinki Final Act which included limited CBMs. Following the CSCE were two review conferences, one in Belgrade from 1977 to 1978, and one in Madrid from 1980 to 1983.* The Stockholm negotiations themselves were the direct result of the Helsinki process and its two review conferences.

As steps toward regulating the use of military force, CBMs have assumed significance in the study and pursuit of arms control today. This importance is bound to increase as the nations involved in the CSCE process negotiate further CBMs to enhance the steps agreed to in Stockholm, a process that began in Vienna in mid-1988.[1] But what *are* CBMs, what are their purposes, and how have they been pursued? The following discussion examines these questions, surveys the records of compliance with the Helsinki and Stockholm Agreements, and illustrates how CBMs have influenced European security in the past fifteen years.

WHAT IS A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURE?

Generally speaking, CBMs comprise agreements between two or more nations which enhance the predictability of routine military activities. The more advanced forms can, in addition, establish limitations on the use of military forces, set up mechanisms designed to alleviate perceived threats, or a combination of the two.[2] These measures can, of course, be implemented unilaterally. Confidence-building can be described as 'operational' arms control as opposed to the 'structural' arms control of such negotiations as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) or the talks on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In 'structural' arms control, the weapons or forces themselves are limited in some quantitative or qualitative manner.

The main purpose of CBMs in Europe is to lessen the possibility of a surprise attack using conventional forces. In addition, as described by Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, another role of CBMs in Europe is "the communication of credible evidence of the absence of feared threats." They added that another major objective of CBMs was "to provide reassurance to the rest of the states in Europe." The implemented measures "should do this by reducing uncertainties and by constraining opportunities for exerting pressure through military activity." In an ideal situation, "confidence would be enhanced to the extent that the option of surprise military action receded into the background."[3]

*At the conclusion of the Madrid Review Conference, the confidence-building measures were strengthened to the extent that they are now referred to as confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). For the purpose of clarity in this paper, however, CBMs will be used throughout.

The Helsinki Final Act recognized the need for CBMs:

> ... to contribute to reducing the dangers of armed conflict and of misunderstanding and miscalculation of military activities which could give rise to apprehension, particularly in a situation where the participating States lack clear and timely information about the nature of such activities ...[4]

THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

The Helsinki Accords were negotiated by the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 3 July 1973 and 1 August 1975. The main body of the resulting document, called the Final Act, was divided into three 'baskets': 'basket one' for questions related to security, 'basket two' for economic and technological issues, and 'basket three' dealing with humanitarian concerns.[5]

The second part of 'basket one', the Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, addressed the participants' desire to eliminate causes of tension and establish codes of conduct to contribute to the strengthening of peace and security in the world. By adopting specific measures to fulfil this desire, the signatories institutionalized a moderate yet historically significant system of multilateral CBMs.

The Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

The CBM document was divided into three sections. The first, dealing with prior notification of major military manoeuvres and related items, was the most significant. The second section dealt with questions relating to disarmament, while the third contained general considerations.

In the first section, the agreed measures fell into two basic categories: notification of, and observation of, manoeuvres. The signatories agreed to notify all other participants of major military manoeuvres involving more than 25,000 troops. Notification applied to land forces independently or in any combination with air and naval forces. Amphibious and airborne troops were included in the measure by means of a broad interpretation of the word, 'troop'. The Accords also invited participants to notify voluntarily manoeuvres under the 25,000 troop level.

Notification was required for any manoeuvre held on the territory of a participating state in Europe, including adjoining sea and airspace where applicable. In the cases of Turkey and the Soviet Union, whose territories extend beyond Europe, notification was required only if the manoeuvre took place in an area within 250 kilometres of another participating European state, unless that space also faced a non-participating state. Notification must be given 21 days or more in advance of the manoeuvre, or as

early as possible in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice. The required information was quite general: for example, the designation, purpose, size, states involved, type of forces, location and time-frame of the manoeuvre.

The Final Act also makes provision, on a voluntary and bilateral basis, "in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill," for the invitation of observers to view manoeuvres. The number of observers and the conditions and procedures for their participation are left to the discretion of the inviting state.

The Accords also invited participants to make prior notifications of military movements, on a voluntary basis. Further, signatories were encouraged to improve mutual understanding by promoting exchanges between participants and reciprocal visits of military personnel.

The Helsinki CBMs have had only limited *military* consequence. The lack of a verification regime, the relatively high threshold for notification, the general nature of the information required, and the voluntary form of many of the guidelines — including those for invitation of observers — amounted to a minimal constraint on the participants' military forces. The meaning of the term 'troops' and the method for measuring the number of troops involved in manoeuvres were deliberately left ambiguous. Even the 21-day notice-period was, for some cases, watered down to notification "as soon as possible." Furthermore, there was no agreement on distinct definitions for the terms 'manoeuvres' and 'movements'.

However, the *political* significance of the agreed measures — and the fact that they were agreed to at all — was considerable. Indeed, the Helsinki CBMs were intended to be of primarily political importance. The measures contributed significantly to the effort to establish a structural basis for security in Europe. Moreover, the Accords recognized that the experience gained in implementing these measures, combined with further efforts, "could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence."

THE STOCKHOLM AGREEMENT

The CSCE participants agreed in Helsinki to hold follow-up meetings to review the implementation of the Final Act and to consider the possibility of a new conference. The first of these was held in Belgrade from 4 October 1977 to 9 March 1978; and the second was held in Madrid from 11 November 1980 to 9 September 1983. Proposals on new and enhanced CBMs were put forward at both follow-up meetings. In Belgrade, participants were barely able to agree on the Concluding Document which would allow them to continue their work in Madrid. Despite acrimonious differences at the Madrid meeting — much attention was focussed on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — it was agreed that a major conference on the subject of CBMs would be held in Stockholm.

The Concluding Document of the Madrid meeting stated that the participants would "undertake, in stages, new, effective and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament, so as to give effect and expression to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations." The measures pursued were to cover the "whole of Europe as well as the adjoining sea area and airspace." They were to be "of military significance and politically binding" and "provide adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content."[6] The word 'security' was added to confidence-building measures (to become confidence- and security-building measures) to show that the new measures would go further than those agreed to in Helsinki.

The Stockholm Confidence-Building Measures

The delegates to the conference in Stockholm negotiated from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986. The Stockholm Agreement, which went into effect on 1 January 1987, contains six principal sections outlining agreed measures:[7]

1) *Declaratory Measures:* In accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, the signatories restate their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force.

2) *Notification Measures:* States agree to announce military activities involving at least 13,000 troops, or 300 battle tanks, 42 days or more in advance. This measure applies to land forces (including amphibious, airmobile, and airborne troops) independently, or in any combination with air or naval components. Exercises involving at least 3000 amphibious or airborne troops are notifiable. Also contained in the Agreement are information measures, such as revealing the general purpose of the activity and the states involved. These measures were intended to enhance transparency and provide greater definition for notifiable exercises.

3) *Observation:* States conducting certain activities are required to invite all other signatories to those involving the types of forces identified above, when the level meets or exceeds 17,000 troops or, in the case of amphibious landing or airborne assault, 5000 troops. Each signatory can send as many as two military or civilian observers. The Host State is responsible for providing most services for the observers, though this responsibility can be shared with other participating states if notified in the invitations. The duration of the observation is set by the Host State with observers allowed to view the exercises until the numbers fall below the defined threshold. Observers are not allowed to view restricted areas. Signatories are not

required to invite observers to military activities regarded as alert exercises, for which the troops themselves have not received prior notice, unless these activities are of greater than seventy-two hours duration.

4) *Annual Calendars:* Every year signatories must exchange, no later than 15 November, calendars of their military activities that are subject to prior notification. The calendars must include such information as the size of the planned activity, the type of troops involved, and the location and purpose of the activity.

5) *Constraining Provisions:* Notice for military activities involving over 40,000 troops and over 75,000 troops must be given one and two years in advance, respectively. Unnotified activities should be kept to as few as possible.

6) *Compliance and Verification:* The agreed measures for verifying compliance with the Stockholm Agreement were of historic significance. For the first time ever, military activities which may not comply with the Agreement are subject to challenge, on-site inspections. No State is required to accept more than three such inspections per calendar year, and not more than one from the same inspecting nation, but it is understood that participating States belonging to the same military alliance will not take advantage of this provision. Both ground and aerial inspections are allowed, with the inspecting nation specifying the flight-path of the aircraft, and the aircraft itself chosen by mutual consent. Inspection teams must be allowed into the territory of the inspected State within thirty-six hours of the request. The inspection must last no longer than forty-eight hours. Some provisions allow certain sensitive areas to be exempt from inspection, but these are carefully circumscribed.

It is generally acknowledged that the Stockholm Agreement largely fulfilled the Madrid Mandate to produce more politically and militarily significant CBMs. Militarily, the agreed measures strengthened the document substantially over the Helsinki Accords. The level of transparency among the participants was raised through the mandatory use of observers, calendars, and notifications. Constraining provisions, though limited, were introduced into the European CBM regime. Most noteworthy, however, were the measures adopted to verify compliance with the Agreement. The intrusiveness and quick response involved in implementing these verification measures were meant to dissuade irregular use of military forces. Overall, there is evidence to suggest that the Agreement has encouraged participating military planners to assess their plans in light of the requirements laid down in Stockholm.

Politically, the Agreement is far more binding than were the Helsinki Accords; the language used is stronger and the terms better defined. It represents the first time that the Eastern bloc has accepted the concept of on-site inspection.[8] This acceptance was crucial if the Agreement were to be substantive.[9]

However, criticism has been levelled at the Stockholm Agreement, particularly in regard to its military significance. Analysts have stated that its provisions are too limited; the Agreement cannot effectively restrict the use of military force.[10] They cite drawbacks such as: the ability to conduct alert exercises and mobilization activities without notice; the limited constraints on very large exercises; and the small number of inspections permitted for each State.

Compliance with the Helsinki Confidence-Building Measures

The Helsinki CBMs were, in general, adhered to by the CSCE participants. In the eleven years during which the Helsinki CBMs were in force, only one formal complaint was made. The record of compliance shows that the implementation of the Helsinki Accords was very much a political exercise, subject to the changing East-West climate of the 1975-1986 period.

Table I shows that a total of 130 exercises were notified between 1975 and 1986.[11] The majority of these — seventy-four — were mandatory notifications of major exercises as agreed in Helsinki. The remaining fifty-six consisted of voluntary notification of smaller exercises. Observers were invited to forty-six major and twenty smaller manoeuvres. Table I shows that NATO countries notified more of their smaller exercises, and invited more observers to monitor them, than did the Warsaw Pact countries. The record of the Neutral and Non-Aligned (NNA) countries compares favorably with that of NATO. This pattern reveals a greater propensity on the part of NATO and the NNA to go beyond the letter of the Final Act.

Table I: Exercises Notified Under the Helsinki Final Act 1975-86

	Major Exercises (> 25 000)	Smaller Exercises (< 25 000)	Total
NATO			
notified	37	38	75
observers invited	31	15	46
Warsaw Pact			
notified	27	7	34
observers invited	8	1	9
NNA			
notified	10	11	21
observers invited	7	4	11
Subtotals			
notified	**74**	**56**	**130**
observers invited	**46**	**20**	**66**

Note: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization
WP = Warsaw Pact
NNA = Neutral and Non-Aligned.

In its first invitation following the conclusion of the Final Act, NATO invited all CSCE participants to an October 1975 exercise. In September 1976 it voluntarily notified and invited some Warsaw Pact members to a smaller exercise. The Warsaw Pact did not accept either of these invitations.

The Warsaw Pact invited observers to its first exercise following the Accords in February 1976. However, in contrast, it invited a limited number of participants, including only Greece and Turkey from NATO. The United States was not invited to a Warsaw Pact exercise until February 1978, at the same time as the Belgrade Review Meeting. The United States declined the second invitation to a manoeuvre, held in July 1979, and was not invited again until September 1986. In September 1983 the Warsaw Pact notified the first and only smaller exercise to which it invited observers.

The Warsaw Pact consistently notified its major exercises twenty-one days in advance, following the agreed guidelines. Smaller manoeuvres were notified with shorter warning times, ranging from the same day to twenty-one days in advance. NATO warning time for major exercises was twenty-one days or more. For smaller exercises, notification was four days or more.

NATO repeatedly criticized the Warsaw Pact for failing to provide more than a minimal amount of information — such as location, type, purpose of exercise — in its notifications. United States documents claim that, while hosting observers at manoeuvres, NATO and the NNA allowed much greater access and more flexible conditions than did the Warsaw Pact. Western observers often found themselves viewing staged drills. They had little liberty of movement or freedom to use cameras and binoculars.

The only significant breaches of the Final Act occurred in 1981. In March, the Warsaw Pact carried out an exercise in Poland, *Soyuz '81*, which was not notified. Western reports suggested that the exercise may have involved more than 25,000 troops, and therefore should have been notified. But there were some ambiguities; the incident was not pursued. In September, participants were given improper notification of an exercise, *ZAPAD '81*, which took place in the Soviet Union near the Polish border. No name for the manoeuvre was given, and neither the type of forces involved nor the size of the exercise was mentioned, counter to the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. The United States made a formal protest of the incomplete notification.

There were other minor irritations, but, in general, compliance with the letter of the Accords was relatively good. Even under the limited measures in place, confidence increased. The procedures created some transparency among the military forces involved, and some predictability in the way those forces were deployed and exercised.

For more substantial confidence to be created and nurtured, however, the participants had to accept and develop the spirit of the Final Act in a broad sense. Neither the Warsaw Pact nor NATO was very successful in this regard.

The Soviet Union did not seem to be interested in pursuing the spirit of Helsinki: it failed to notify smaller manoeuvres, provided minimal information, and invited observers only infrequently. On a more general level, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the Polish situation in the 1980s, and the Soviet Union's intransigence on human rights and arms control issues during that period, further undermined the confidence and cooperation that was supposed to develop from the Final Act.

At first, the United States, and the other NATO allies, exhibited more willingness to encourage the spirit of Helsinki by notifying smaller exercises, freely disseminating information, and treating observers attentively. Although this approach of strict compliance continued throughout the period during which the Accords were in effect, by the end of the 1970s the West had become disillusioned with détente and angered by the seeming opportunism of the Soviets. The American reaction in the late 1970s, and even more so in the the early 1980s, was to assume a hard line against the Soviet Union by reducing bilateral and multilateral contacts, pursuing a significant military build-up, and becoming more willing to use military rather than diplomatic means to deal with international crises. The West's superior record of compliance was used as a means of impugning that of the Soviets. The Helsinki process was relegated to the background of foreign policy objectives.

East-West relations during this period deteriorated to an extent not witnessed since the height of the Cold War. Whatever confidence had been built up through the adherence to the letter of the agreement withered away because of the inability of either side to pursue and enhance the spirit of the Accords.

Compliance with the Stockholm Confidence-Building Measures

The Stockholm Agreement has been in effect for more than three years, and it is now possible to begin to assess the compliance of participants. Though some problems have been reported, the signatories have adhered to the letter of the Agreement to a remarkably high degree. As mentioned previously, the language of the Stockholm Agreement is better defined, its rules more strictly enforceable, than those of the Helsinki Accords.

Table II shows that 115 exercises were forecast in the first three calendars issued by all CSCE participants, covering the period from 1987 to 1989. In addition, nine advance forecasts (exercises involving over 40,000 troops)

Table II: Forecasting Calendars, Notifications and Observations

	NATO	WP	NNA	Total
1987				
exercises forecast	17 (3 Advance)	25	5	47
exercises notified	19	25	2	46
exercises observed	9	8	0	17
1988				
exercises forecast	13	22	3	38
exercises notified	13	21	3	37
exercises observed	8	7 3	18	
1989				
exercises forecast	10 (6 Advance)	17	3	30
exercises notified	10	17	3	30
exercises observed	6	5	2	13
Total forecast	**40 (9 Advance)**	**64**	**11**	**115**
Total notified	**42**	**63**	**8**	**113**
Total observable	**23**	**20**	**5**	**48**

have been listed — all by NATO nations. The Table shows that the number of exercises forecast in these calendars is not always the same as those that are later notified. This occurs for a variety of reasons: changes in military planning can lower the level of troops to a non-notifiable number; exercises are forecast even though they are planned to be held at non-notifiable levels; and non-forecast exercises are sometimes added later.

In the three years since the Stockholm Agreement entered into force, the annual number of exercises has decreased. Perhaps this trend will continue. The Warsaw Pact has held more exercises than NATO, but they tend to be smaller and involve fewer nations at a time. When combined operations do occur within the Warsaw Pact, they usually involve only the Soviet Union and one alliance partner. In precedent-setting procedures, some participating nations have issued calendars stating that they have no notifiable activities to report, or that they have forecast non-notifiable activities. Whether such initiatives will evolve into regular behaviour remains to be seen.

Table III shows the number of challenge inspections carried out by signatories.* Significantly, the NNA has not to date inspected or been inspected. This lack of experience is regrettable. In some future time of heightened tensions, experienced neutral inspectors could act as crucial interlocutors between East and West.

CSCE participants have stated that they are generally satisfied with the degree of compliance with the

*Canada inspected its first exercise through the Stockholm arrangements in June 1989. The exercise took place in Czechoslovakia.

Table III: Challenge Inspections — as of October 1989

	By NATO	By WP	By NNA	Total
1987	2	3	0	5
1988	7	6	0	13
1989	7	3	0	10
Total	**16**	**12**	**0**	**28**

Agreement thus far. Observations and inspections have been carried out routinely without any significant problems. Military and diplomatic officials have stated that implementation of the Agreement has increased transparency of military actions among the participants and thus reduced tensions.

While the letter of the Agreement has been upheld, comments have been made about the openness and flexibility exhibited by some of the participating nations. NATO officials, for example, have stated that in general they were given more cooperation and freedom of movement while observing Eastern European exercises than during Soviet exercises. In addition, Warsaw Pact nations varied in the degree to which they allowed observers the use of cameras, dictaphones, and the like. These nations also differed in the quality of briefings given before exercises, the observers' access to command posts, and to transportation. NATO officials were often unable to determine which Warsaw Pact military units were participating in certain activities because their shoulder patches were covered up. These problems reflect a lack of cooperation on the part of the Warsaw Pact, but are not considered failures to comply with the Agreement.

The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has issued a number of more substantive complaints against the West. For example, Czechoslovakia claimed that the US exercise, *Caravan Guard* '87, held in early 1987, was not properly notified. The United States argued that, according to the Stockholm Agreement, exercises held within the first forty-two days of 1987 were notifiable only under the terms of the Helsinki Accords. Hence, the United States was not obligated to notify the exercise.

In a case concerning advance forecasts, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia charged in 1987 that the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) failed to forecast, in December 1986, the NATO exercise, *Certain Challenge*. The United States and the FRG responded that the exercise had been notified by the US in its annual calendar. Furthermore, because its involvement in the exercise was below the 40,000 advance notification level, the FRG was not required to give advance notification. This exercise was, however, included in the 1988 FRG calendar.

In May 1987 the United States announced that two forecast exercises, *Iron Forge* and *Compass Point*,

originally planned to be of observable size, had been reduced to less than notifiable size. In a statement at the Vienna Review Meeting of the CSCE, Czechoslovakia implied that the United States reduced the size of the exercises in order to avoid observation. The US declared that voluntary notification of the exercises illustrated its commitment to the spirit of the Stockholm Agreement.

The Soviet Union inspected *Iron Forge* in October 1987 and reported that the exercise had involved more troops than notified. Both the FRG, as host state for the exercise, and the United States, denied the charge.

Another Soviet allegation of noncompliance was made following the inspection of the US activity, *Reforger-related Concentration*, held in September 1988. The Soviet Union claimed that the FRG had violated its host-state responsibilities by not notifying two years in advance an activity involving more than 75,000 troops. This allegation was again rejected by the United States and the FRG, who argued that the Soviet Union had included in their tally forces involved in separate activities in surrounding areas. According to US documents, these other activities were fully acknowledged by the United States and the FRG at the time of the inspection.

Despite the serious nature of these complaints, the Warsaw Pact has not pushed its claims very far. A possible explanation for this is the benign political climate that has existed between East and West in the latter half of the 1980s. Relatively good political relations, particularly between the superpowers, have enabled the Stockholm signatories to overlook strictly technical issues of noncompliance or questionable practices, with a view to maintaining and enhancing the levels of confidence achieved through the Agreement. In this sense, political compliance — that is, upholding the spirit of the Agreement — has taken precedence over technical compliance. Illustrative of this point is the informal competition among participants to be the best hosts for observers.

At the same time, perhaps East-West cordiality has failed to test the Stockholm Agreement sufficiently. Could the agreement withstand a deterioration in East-West relations? Are nations willing to comply with its measures in a situation of increased political tension, allowing short-notice, intrusive inspections of their military manoeuvres? Can the patterns and procedures established through the Stockholm process and technical adherence to its guidelines provide the constancy necessary to maintain trust and predictability in military affairs during periods of political disturbance?

CONCLUSION

Interested observers of the Stockholm and Helsinki CBMs tend to have high expectations for these agreements. The CBMs discussed above cannot alone regulate European military affairs; political ups and downs still determine the mix of military tension and stability. The Helsinki Accords and Stockholm Agreement have, however, established initial steps toward lessening mistrust and misconception among political and military leaders in Europe. In current negotiations on CBMs among the thirty-five CSCE participants in Vienna, many of the proposals put forth are extensions of the Stockholm provisions.

These CBMs have educated all participants. Notification, observation, and inspection have built confidence and lessened fears among participants — individuals and governments. As an unexpected benefit of the Stockholm procedures, participants gained insights into verification methods that have been applied to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and will prove useful for a future arms control agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe.

The Stockholm Agreement has emerged as an effective means of exchanging information, but signatories recognize the need to pursue a follow-up agreement which will be complementary to a conventional forces reduction agreement in Europe. Such a combination will greatly enhance the stability of Europe's political and military affairs.

NOTES

1. The nations involved in the CSCE process are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

2. For an extensive discussion of the concept of Confidence-Building Measures, see: James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, Arms Control and Disarmament Studies No. 1, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, 1985.

3. Johan Jorgen Holst and Karen Alette Melander, "European Security and Confidence Building Measures," *Survival*, vol. 29, no. 4, July/August 1977, pp. 147-148.

4. *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act*, in Robert Spencer, (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1982, p. 505.

5. For the full text of the Helsinki Accord see: United States, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, "On the Occasion of the 12th Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki, 1975*, Washington, 1 August 1987.

6. "Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," in Robert Spencer (ed.), *Canada and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1984, p. 411.

7. For the full text of the Stockholm Agreement see: Department of External Affairs, *Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe convened in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, Ottawa, 1986.

8. For a more detailed discussion of the negotiation of the Stockholm Agreement see: C.A. Namiesniowski, *The Stockholm Agreement: An Exercise in Confidence Building*, Background Paper 14, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, September 1987.

9. The acceptance of on-site verification has been highlighted by many analysts as a turning point in the Soviet approach to arms control and proved to be critical to the successful negotiation of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States.

10. See, for example: Richard E. Darilek, "The Future of Conventional Arms Control in Europe, A Tale of Two Cities: Stockholm and Vienna," in *Survival*, vol. 29, no. 1, January-February 1987, pp. 5-21.

11. The following information was obtained from a series of documents published by the United States Department of State entitled, *Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act*, Semi-annual Reports, nos. 1-21, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington; Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *The Helsinki Process and East West Relations: Progress in Perspective, A Report on the Positive Aspects of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, 1975-1984*, Washington, March 1985; and Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Basket 1 — Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings Eleven Years After Helsinki, Report Submitted to the Congress of the United States*, 99th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, November 1986.

Michael Holmes was a research assistant at the Institute from September 1987 to December 1989.

The views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be taken to represent the views of the Institute and its Board.

Published by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. Additional copies are available from the Institute: 360 Albert Street, Suite 900, Ottawa, Ontario, K1R 7X7.

Le présent exposé est également publié en français.

ISBN: 0-662-17518-2